I. Introduction
In  the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution  which expanded the scope of state responsibility to address indirect situations, setting forth duties to " [r] efrain from providing any form of support, active or passive" to terrorists and to " [d] eny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens. " It also called for states to "prevent those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other states or their citizens. " 1 There have been developments in theory and practice which indicate efforts to transform the normative content of this resolution into international customary law. This is pursued by seeking consensus as to its content, demonstrating legal applicability, and applying creative argumentation for effective implementation via traditional and new compliance mechanisms. 2 appears that violation of  itself is increasingly being characterized as constituting a threat to international peace and security. 3 It has been suggested that there are attempts to transfer the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (RP) (which originally conditioned the state's sovereign right to non-interference in domestic affairs to its own fulfilment of human rights duties) to the field of counterterrorism, becoming the Responsibility to Prevent Terrorism. 4 Under classic RP, states have an erga omnes duty to protect and to prevent violations of human rights (genocide, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity) and war crimes. Failure to do so would flag the responsibility of the international community to respond. There are numerous efforts to expand RP's application beyond these specific criteria, for example in order to respond to harm caused by natural disasters. 5 Nevertheless, this has not yet been accepted by the UN Security Council. Similarly, as stated by Vincent Joel Proulx, one may evince efforts to support recognition of a state duty to prevent terrorism as another obligation erga omnes. Tal Becker buttresses this view:
The duty of states to prevent, and abstain from any involvement in acts of terrorism is beyond question in international law. At a fundamental level, these obligations are a corollary of sovereignty and arise from the basic duty of the state to exercise due diligence in order to prevent harm to other states or their nationals emanating from its territory. 6  Proulx asserts that the international community has moved toward a model of indirect responsibility, which has supplanted direct responsibility in the field of attribution. 
